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Patrick A. Messerlin
China finds itself in a unique situation on antidumping and safeguard issues. It is by
far the main target of antidumping measures, but (so far) one of the smallest users of
such measures. China’s World Trade Organization (WTO) accession protocol includes
stringent antidumping and safeguard provisions that its trading partners may use
against its exports. The article examines three related concerns: how quickly large
developing economies can become intensive users of antidumping measures, an
evolution raising concerns about China’s recent antidumping enforcement; how
China could minimize its exposure to foreign antidumping cases, a recipe for both
improving trade outcomes and for China’s taking a leading role in reforming WTO
antidumping; and the opportunities that the Doha Round of trade negotiations offer
to China for negotiating stricter disciplines both on WTO contingent protection and on
the use by China’s trading partners of the special provisions included in China’s
accession protocol.
On November 10, 2001, China was accepted as a full member in the World
Trade Organization (WTO). A few weeks earlier, China’s chief trade negotia-
tor, Long Yongtu, had put ‘‘stricter rules on antidumping’’ second among
China’s priorities in the WTO. At that time the United States was still fighting
to exclude antidumping from the topics to be discussed at the WTO Doha
Ministerial Meeting and the European Union was adopting an ambiguous
position.
In the early stages of the negotiations under the Doha Round development
agenda, China finds itself in a unique situation on antidumping and safeguard
issues. China’s WTO accession protocol includes special provisions on antidumping
and safeguards that its trading partners may use against Chinese exports. These
include continuing use of ‘‘nonmarket economy’’ status in antidumping investiga-
tions for 15 years and use of a special ‘‘transitional product-specific safeguard’’
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provision for 12 years.1 China is by far the main target of antidumping measures
even though it is one of the smallest users of suchmeasures. But the past decade has
shown how quickly large developing economies can become intensive users of this
instrument, and the evolution of China’s antidumping enforcement in 2002 and
early 2003 raises concerns in this respect.
Section I of this article describes the current situation with respect to anti-
dumping. It is used massively by only 10 countries (4 industrial and 6 develop-
ing), and there is strong asymmetry, best illustrated by China, between countries
enforcing antidumping and those targeted by antidumping measures. Section II
examines how China could minimize its exposure to foreign antidumping
cases—an option that would be a recipe for both improving trade outcomes
and for China taking a leading role in reforming WTO antidumping. Section III
analyzes China’s antidumping regulations and its first cases, including their
crucial relationship with the existing web of the U.S. and EU antidumping
cases. Section IV examines the opportunities the Doha Round offers to China
for negotiating stricter disciplines both on WTO contingent protection and on the
use of the nonmarket economy and transitional product-specific safeguard
provisions by China’s trading partners. The conclusion summarizes the crucial
choices to be made by China in antidumping and safeguard policy.
I . THE CURRENT SITUATION
During the November 2001 WTO Doha Ministerial Meeting, antidumping was
perceived as an issue pitting developing economies, anxious to discipline the use
of this instrument, against the United States, which was (and still is) reluctant to
change its own antidumping regulations. However, a much more complex
picture emerges from a close examination of the antidumping measures in
force at the end of each year during 1995–2002, which are notified to the WTO
Secretariat by WTO members.2
Antidumping Users and Targeted Countries: A Key Asymmetry
Examination of the stock of antidumping measures in force shows two main results
(table 1). First, the top 10 antidumping users enforce 90 percent of the antidumping
measures notified to the WTO, whereas they represent 70 percent of world gross
1. In spring 2002 the European Union and the United States declared that they would consider Russia
a market economy for purposes of antidumping. However, the case for introduction of a transitional
product-specific safeguard provision in Russia’s accession protocol seems open. It would be interesting to
make a parallel between the conditions imposed on Japan’s accession to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and those imposed on China in its accession to the WTO.
2. Tables 1–3 treat measures taken against individual EU member states as one aggregated measure if
adopted at the same time and for the same product (data for 2002 are still not complete). Table 4 follows
the notifications of EU trading partners, which vary in their treatment of the European Union (as one
entity or as a set of distinct member states).
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domestic product (GDP) and 50 percent of the world trade. Worldwide antidumping
enforcement is thus highly concentrated in fewer than a dozen countries.
Second, the situation prevailing during the Uruguay Round—antidumping
users were almost exclusively industrial countries—is no longer true. Six new
intensive antidumping users are developing economies (Argentina, Brazil, India,
Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey), and they have almost caught up with the
four major traditional users. These new users implemented more than a third of
the antidumping measures in force in 2002, up from less than a fourth in 1995.
Meanwhile, the share of measures of the four traditional users declined from
more than two-thirds to half the total number of antidumping measures in force
during the period. In another worrisome sign of increasing use of antidumping
measures, the remaining developing economies, though still small users individ-
ually, together doubled their global share of measures in force during the
observation period.
Examination of the stock of antidumping measures in force by targeted
country shows a marked asymmetry between antidumping users and targets
(tables 1 and 2). The top 10 users are the targets of less than a third of all the
measures in force, and the gap between using antidumping measures and being a
TABLE 1. Top 10 Antidumping Users, 1995–2001 (number of
measures in force)
Country
or group 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Average
number
by value
of imports
Average
applied
tarrif
Industrial countries
Australia 78 46 40 49 39 44 59 38 0.77 5.8
Canada 79 78 78 65 72 71 85 83 0.38 4.8
European Union 140 138 138 139 159 175 175 183 0.19 4.6
United States 265 271 271 281 282 202 227 239 0.29 4.3
Developing economies
Argentina 15 30 33 39 45 42 45 60 1.17 13.7
Brazil 21 28 23 28 38 43 49 54 0.51 12.5
India 13 15 24 44 58 94 115 181 1.28 39.6
Mexico 93 92 81 86 80 77 61 55 0.72 12.6
South Africa 12 29 42 56 87 96 94 80 1.81 15.0
Turkey 37 37 34 34 35 14 16 30 0.61 12.7
All other 50 59 84 102 122 117 97 — 0.04 —
China — — 0 0 4 8 11 17 0.03 15.8
All countries 803 823 848 923 1,017 975 1,023 — 0.21 —
Note: Measures in force include antidumping duties and undertakings in force as of December
31 of the year. —, Not available.
aAverage number per $1,000 of 1997 imports of the user country.
Source: Author’s computations based on WTO Reports on Antidumping (G/ADP/N series at
www.wto.org), WTO trade data, and WTO (2001).
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target widened in 2001 and 2002. In sum, antidumping is currently an instru-
ment enforced by a few large countries against the smaller economies of the rest
of the world. Thus there is little pressure coming from the rest of the world to
urge intensive antidumping users to restrain their actions.
For the top 10 antidumping users, with the exception of Brazil, the domestic
interests that are hurt by foreign antidumping measures are smaller than the
interests that benefit from antidumping protection. This reflects the well-known
economic proposition that views protection more as a conflict between domestic
export interests and import-competing interests than as a conflict between
countries. To capture this aspect, the number of foreign antidumping measures
in force against the exports of a top user can be adjusted by the size of the
country’s exports (in thousands of U.S. dollars; see table 2). These trade-
adjusted measures mirror the intensity of foreign pressures imposed on the
export interests of a country, thus giving an indication of the incentives of
these export interests to contribute to the opening of domestic markets. These
numbers can then be compared with the trade-adjusted antidumping measures
in force by the country in question (see table 1), which can be interpreted as an
TABLE 2. Top 10 Antidumping Targets, 1995–2001 (number of
measures in force)
Country
or group 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Average
number
by value
of exportsa
Industrial countries
Australia 5 6 5 6 5 5 5 5 0.08
Canada 19 19 19 19 20 18 8 8 0.08
European Union 77 88 89 102 132 149 99 98 0.13
United States 60 66 66 68 66 62 57 67b 0.09
Developing economies
Argentina 9 8 7 7 7 7 9 8 0.30
Brazil 48 51 52 45 42 43 34 51 0.85
India 15 15 15 21 29 35 42 44 0.72
Mexico 11 15 17 17 19 21 17 17 0.15
South Africa 7 10 11 11 12 15 16 24 0.39
Turkey 9 9 6 8 10 13 12 18 0.37
All other 543 536 561 619 675 611 724 — 0.29
China 143 148 180 193 202 207 199 212 0.99
All countries 803 823 848 923 1,017 979 1,023 — 0.22
Note: Measures in force include antidumping duties and undertakings in force as of December
31 of this year. —, Not available.
aAverage number per $1,000 of 1997 exports of targeted country.
bIncomplete estimate.
Source: Author’s computations based on WTO Reports on Antidumping (G/ADP/N series at
www.wto.org) and WTO trade data.
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indication of the strength of the incentives of import-competing interests to
induce their government to use antidumping. The observed imbalance between
export interests and import-competing antidumping beneficiaries in the top 10
antidumping users suggests that it is unlikely that domestic coalitions in these
key users, which are also key WTO players, are strong enough to support anti-
dumping reforms in the WTO.
This situation raises a question that needs to be carefully examined in the
future. The data on antidumping measures in force suggest that antidumping
measures by the six major developing economy antidumping users impose
welfare costs on their own domestic economies that are higher than the costs
imposed on industrial economies by their antidumping measures, for two rea-
sons. First is the marked difference between the number of measures imposed by
developing and industrial countries once adjusted for trade size. The average
number of measures in force per $1,000 of goods imported (in 1997) by an
antidumping user is a better indicator of the potential harm done by antidump-
ing to the domestic economy than the absolute number of measures. This
indicator is much higher for developing economies than for industrial countries,
ranging from 0.5 for Brazil to 1.8 for South Africa and from 0.2 for the
European Union to 0.4 for Canada (with an exception, Australia, at 0.8).
These differences would be even larger if the number of antidumping measures
were adjusted for the number of tariff lines concerned because developing
economies tend to cover many more tariff items with antidumping cases than
do industrial countries. The second reason for higher welfare costs is that
available information (though not systematic) suggests that antidumping duties
enforced by developing countries are, on average, more severe than those
imposed by industrial countries—and economic analysis shows that welfare
costs increase more rapidly than tariffs do.
China’s Special Situation
China has been the main target of antidumping measures—18 percent of anti-
dumping cases in 1995 and almost 20 percent in 2001 and 2002 (see table 2).
Examination of the raw number of antidumping measures imposed on Chinese
exports by the top 10 antidumping users and the number of measures adjusted for
trade value between each trade partner and China (the average number of cases per
$100,000 of exports fromChina to these users) shows that China is targeted much
more by developing economies than by industrial countries (table 3). China is
almost exclusively targeted by the top antidumping users, all of them being
relatively large economies.
All this raises a key question about China’s role in future antidumping
activities. Will China follow the same path as other large developing economies,
rapidly increasing the number of antidumping cases against other countries? Or
will China adopt a different approach, minimizing the use of antidumping
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measures and invest its negotiating strength in the WTO in working for stricter
antidumping rules, as its chief trade negotiator announced? Clearly, China’s
decision will have a decisive impact on the evolution of world antidumping
enforcement and on WTO trade disciplines more generally.
II . MINIMIZ ING CHINA ’S EXPOSURE TO FOREIGN ANTIDUMPING
The slow pace of WTO negotiations means that China would likely not be able
to get reforms of WTO antidumping rules into play for at least two (more
likely four) years. Meanwhile, it will be hard for Chinese authorities to resist
pressures from import-competing firms in China that demand more intensive
use of antidumping procedures. One possibility: Could China adopt measures
minimizing as quickly as possible its exposure to foreign antidumping, alle-
viating the political costs of playing a reforming role in WTO antidumping
rules?
TABLE 3. Share of Antidumping Measures in Force against Imports from
China, 1995–2002 (% of total antidumping measures in force by user country)
Country
or group 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Average
share
1995–2001
Average
number
by value
of imports
from Chinaa
Industrial countries
Australia 9.0 4.3 10.0 8.2 7.7 4.5 5.1 7.9 7.0 0.7
Canada 7.6 7.7 10.3 10.8 8.3 8.5 10.6 10.8 9.1 1.8
European Union 20.7 21.7 23.2 23.0 20.8 19.4 19.4 15.8 21.2 1.0
United States 12.8 13.7 15.1 14.6 14.5 16.5 18.5 18.0 15.1 1.7
Developing economies
Argentina 33.3 20.0 30.3 35.9 31.1 21.4 15.6 20.0 26.8 10.0
Brazil 14.3 14.3 21.7 28.6 28.9 25.6 22.4 20.4 22.3 4.7
India 38.5 46.7 33.3 27.3 32.8 22.3 25.2 27.1 32.3 10.7
Mexico 33.3 28.3 40.7 38.4 36.3 35.1 44.3 41.8 36.6 60.3
South Africa 8.3 27.6 28.6 23.2 19.5 18.8 19.1 22.5 20.7 12.0
Turkey 13.5 13.5 14.7 17.6 17.1 14.3 25.0 40.0 16.5 4.4
All other 34.0 28.8 26.2 22.5 18.9 12.8 15.5 — 22.7 —
Total number 143 148 180 193 202 179 199 — 174 —
Percent of all anti-
dumping measures
17.8 18.0 21.2 20.9 19.9 18.3 19.5 — 19.4 —
—, Not available.
aPer $1,000 of imports from China.
Source: Author’s computations based on WTO Reports on Antidumping (G/ADP/N series at
www.wto.org) and WTO trade data. The total number of measures is based on Lindsey and Ikenson
(2001).
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As noted, trade problems are fundamentally domestic conflicts between firms—
between export-oriented and import-competing industries. The country-based
data discussed sheds no light on this deeper aspect of protection and can even be
misleading. For instance, the strong asymmetry between antidumping users and
targets shown in tables 1 and 2 could suggest that WTO members would be induced
to bring more antidumping cases until the situation is so bad that WTO members
collectively adopt stricter disciplines on antidumping. Arguments have already
been presented suggesting that the top antidumping users are unlikely to follow
this path. Taking firms’ behavior into account suggests a darker scenario. Petition-
ing firms—the driving forces in antidumping enforcement—may lodge antidump-
ing complaints against several key countries to segment the world market in their
products (evidence supporting this hypothesis is shown later). In that case the
growing use of antidumping measures becomes not an incentive to discipline
antidumping use but an incentive for firms to use the measures ever more inten-
sively. Examining these deeper aspects of antidumping protection requires looking
at the distribution of antidumping measures in force by sector or product rather
than by country.
A Few ‘‘Antidumping-Intensive’’ Sectors
Antidumping measures are concentrated in a handful of Harmonized Tariff
System sections (table 4). Metals, chemicals, machinery and electrical equip-
ment, textiles and clothing, and plastics account for 75 percent of antidumping
measures, even though these sectors account for less than half of world trade.
These sectors are key sources of exports for dynamic developing economies in
the first stages of industrial development, and they tend to have a high propor-
tion of relatively standard products and oligopolistic market structures.
Although the metals and chemicals sectors clearly have these features, the
other sectors require a closer look, with greater disaggregation. There are few
antidumping actions in the machinery and clothing subsectors that are charac-
terized by many firms producing highly differentiated products. Most anti-
dumping actions are in the electrical equipment and textiles subsectors that
are characterized by relatively standard products produced by oligopolistic firms.
This pattern strongly suggests that firms use antidumping as a cheap and
powerful instrument for segmenting the markets that ongoing or scheduled
trade liberalization is making more competitive. It also suggests that antidump-
ing cases are likely to spread to such sectors as clothing that will increasingly
experience product differentiation and imperfect competition (based on trade-
marks, goodwill, distribution channels, and the like). In sum, the observed
sectoral pattern of antidumping reflects the increasing ‘‘privatization’’ of
trade policy by firms that have enough initial oligopolistic power to use the
‘‘procollusion’’ bias is embedded in antidumping regulations—a key lesson that
should be kept in mind when implementing these regulations, in China as
elsewhere.
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China’s Sensitivity to ‘‘Antidumping-Intensive’’ Sectors
Does China import a high proportion of products from antidumping-intensive
Harmonized Tariff System sections? If so, Chinese authorities are likely to be
under strong pressure to impose antidumping measures on such goods, thereby
participating in the worldwide segmentation game that is the ultimate goal of
antidumping enforcement. The five most antidumping-intensive Harmonized
Tariff System sections in table 4 make up almost 70 percent of Chinese imports,
opening the possibility that Chinese firms or foreign firms producing in China
could present antidumping complaints in order to segment world markets.
China’s sensitivity to antidumping-intensive sectors can also be assessed from
an export perspective. China’s machinery and electrical equipment and textiles
and clothing exports are particularly sensitive to worldwide antidumping activ-
ity (see table 4). China would appear to have been a target of foreign antidump-
ing measures much more because of intrinsic economic features of its exported
products (differentiation level and oligopolistic markets) than because China
was not yet a WTO member.
Chinese Policies to Minimize Exposure to Foreign Antidumping
This conclusion implies that China should not expect to face fewer antidumping
measures in the coming years because of its WTO accession. Rather, China
should expect to continue to face a large number of antidumping cases. Of
course, WTO membership gives China access to the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism, which could provide some relief to Chinese exporters harassed by
foreign antidumping. But this relief will probably be only marginal and short-
lived. For instance, the 2001 WTO dispute settlement ruling banning use of the
averaging method is already being circumvented by alternative procedures
(hastily developed by creative petitioners).
A more promising route for minimizing China’s exposure to foreign antidump-
ing measures may be China’s own policies, beginning with its trade policy. If
China’s tariffs in antidumping-intensive sectors remain high at the end of its
accession period, it may not adopt as many or as severe antidumping measures
on imports from the rest of the world in these products (though the analysis in
section I shows that the top developing economy antidumping users have not
hesitated to add high antidumping measures to still unliberalized trade regimes).
But such a tariff policy, far from ensuring fewer antidumping cases against Chinese
exports, will facilitate new antidumping measures against exports in antidumping-
intensive sectors. High Chinese tariffs will permit high prices in domestic markets
in China, making dumping claims against Chinese exporters easier to prove all the
more because the exports in question consist mostly of basic products (for which
Chinese exporters are likely to align their prices to those prevailing in foreign
markets because there are no or small premia for differentiation).
One way to minimize exposure to foreign antidumping would thus be
to adopt uniform and moderate tariffs to reduce distortions in the domestic
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production pattern (foreign antidumping investigators interpret such distortions
as signs of dumping). Although average tariffs for Harmonized Tariff System
sections give very imperfect information on the tariff structure (peak tariffs
within each section are eroded by low tariffs), they suggest that tariff peaks in
China are concentrated in sectors that are not antidumping-intensive activities,
with the exception of textiles and clothing (see table 4).
A uniform tariff policy may help China shift the composition of its exports
away from antidumping-intensive sectors for another reason. Economies such
as Hong Kong (China), Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan
(China) reduced their exposure to foreign antidumping measures by upgrading
their exported products. One could even argue that foreign antidumping meas-
ures accelerated the economic development of these economies by inducing
them to shift production more quickly to highly differentiated products in
which they anticipated having comparative advantage.
EU and U.S. Antidumping ‘‘Echoing’’ against China’s Exports
Capturing antidumping protection as a market segmentation strategy by a few
large firms requires information at the product level, rather than at the aggre-
gated section level of table 4. Table 5 provides such detailed information for EU
and U.S. antidumping actions against China. More precisely, it lists EU and U.S.
‘‘echoing’’ cases against China, antidumping cases that targeted the same Chi-
nese exports. The European Union and the United States are the top antidump-
ing users in the absolute number of measures in force, and they are the two
largest markets for Chinese exports (15 and 21 percent, respectively).
Echoing cases (58 altogether) constitute 75 percent of antidumping cases
initiated against Chinese exports by the United States and 68 percent by the
European Union. These cases generally echoed each other within a year or less.
All but three of these cases (cycles, hammers, and pocket lighters) resulted in
antidumping measures of some kind. Such a large proportion of echoing cases
and the similarity of their outcomes are signs that antidumping is a protectionist
instrument that petitioners are using in a strategic way to segment the two
largest world markets.
Thus, assessment of the welfare costs of antidumping measures should take
into account not only the severity of the measures (the high level of antidumping
duties or the restrictiveness of quantitative restrictions) but also the dramatic
reduction in competition in importing markets. These indirect welfare costs
generated by antidumping-caused collusion compound the direct welfare costs
generated by the antidumping duties.
Examination of echoing cases also shows that U.S. antidumping duties are on
average higher than EU duties: 104 percent compared with 38 percent. How-
ever, comparing the measures closely is difficult because of differences in
regulations and the lack of sufficiently detailed information. For instance,
some EU cases are terminated by the withdrawal of complaints by petitioners.
The effective impact is hard to ascertain. It may be limited to the chilling effect
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on Chinese exporters, forced to export less, or at higher prices, or both, to limit
the risk of facing new antidumping complaints. Or if withdrawals reflect merely
a lack of cooperation by the domestic industry or a failure to get the minimum
number of EU member states to support a proposal to impose measures, they
may reflect the fact that EU petitioners have been able to impose quantity or
price restraints on Chinese exports on a ‘‘private’’ basis—with the corresponding
full-fledged impact that is to be expected from these hidden restraints.
I I I . CHINA ’ S ANTIDUMPING ENFORCEMENT: AT THE CROSSROADS
The following assessment of China’s antidumping regulations and enforcement
is provisional. It is constrained by the limited number of ongoing cases
(a substantial number of cases are often needed for a robust assessment).
China’s Antidumping Regulations
China adopted its first antidumping regulations on March 25, 1997 and the
guidelines necessary for implementing the law later the same year. Following
China’s accession to the WTO, these old regulations were replaced by new
regulations in January 2002, along with another set of guidelines (see G/ADP/
N/1/CHN1 and G/ADP/N/1/CHN2 at www.wto.org and Wang 2003).
China’s regulations follow the usual structure of antidumping legislation:
proof of the existence and estimate of the magnitude of dumping and of material
injury and proof of the causal relation between dumping and injury. However,
they have four striking features. First, many details are left to the detailed
guidelines or to case-by-case practice. Although this is common for countries
that are adopting their first antidumping regulations, this lack of detail gener-
ates legal uncertainty.
Second, China’s regulations include all the (well-known) protectionist biases
of the WTO antidumping provisions. Among these are use of the concept of a
major proportion of the industry as the threshold level for accepting complaints
(a condition that domestic monopolies, oligopolies, or cartels fit much more
easily than competitive industries); possibility of ex officio initiation of cases by
the Chinese authorities; screening of complaints by the antidumping office,
exposing the office to strong and hidden pressures by vested interests; possibility
of withdrawal by petitioners, facilitating private collusion between petitioners
and defendants; cumulation of imports, facilitating demonstration of injury and
widening the geographical scope of protective measures; recourse to constructed
normal values when comparable prices are unavailable in the exporting country,
enabling manipulation of costs and reasonable profit; a broad definition of the
confidentiality of information, limiting the rights of defendants; the possibility
of imposing undertakings as antidumping measures and the requirement that
antidumping duties be borne by importers (the so-called no absorption provi-
sion); the possibility of imposing retroactive antidumping duties where there is a
‘‘history’’ of dumping (that is, recurrent antidumping complaints); and the
118 THE WORLD BANK ECONOMIC REV I EW, VOL . 18 , NO . 1
possibility of taking ‘‘appropriate’’ measures should foreign firms try to circum-
vent the antidumping measures.
Third, prior to the 2003 government reform, coordination of the many admin-
istrative agencies involved in antidumping investigations was extremely complex.
The Fair Trade Administration for Imports and Exports of theMinistry of Foreign
Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) received complaints, decided which to
accept, and was involved in the entire process, including investigation. The State
Economic and Trade Commission joined MOFTEC in determining the existence of
injury at the preliminary stage and conducting the final investigations. The Cus-
toms General Administration joined MOFTEC for some parts of the investigations.
For the imposition of antidumping duties, MOFTEC presented its proposals to the
Tariff Commission under the State Council, which made the decisions. The merger
of the State Economic and Trade Commission and MOFTEC in early 2003 brought
these two functions into one ministry.
Fourth, the old regulations included the following Article 40: ‘‘In the event that
any country or region applies discriminatory antidumping or countervailing meas-
ures against the exports from the People’s Republic of China, the People’s
Republic of China may, as the case may be, take counter-measures against the
country or region in question.’’ It is not known whether this provision led to any
cases, but it clearly opened the possibility for China to use antidumping rules as a
retaliatory instrument. Article 56 of the new regulations is only slightly more
diplomatic: ‘‘Where a country (region) discriminatorily imposes antidumping
measures on the exports from the People’s Republic of China, China may, on the
basis of the actual situations, take corresponding measures against that country
(region).’’
Antidumping Enforcement by China
According to information provided by MOFTEC for antidumping cases under the old
regulations and on China’s latest notification (G/ADP/N/105/CHN) to the WTO for
the cases under the new regulations, 69 cases were initiated between 1997 and
May 2003 (table 6). After a slow start in 1997–98, the number of cases increased
rapidly, reaching 24 in 2002 and 11 for the first five months of 2003. It is unclear
yet whether this simply reflects cases that were in the pipeline for a long time or
whether China has begun to follow in the footsteps of the six top developing
economy antidumping users (see section I) and will soon become another anti-
dumping-intensive user, endangering its so far successful liberalization.
Although it is too early to know whether China’s initial antidumping meas-
ures are representative of future antidumping enforcement, a few observations
are in order. First, antidumping measures have been taken in almost all cases, a
very high percentage compared with what is generally observed (60–70 percent
in industrial countries). Second, the level of the measures adopted by the
Chinese authorities is relatively high, although it seems that the most recent
measures are less severe than the ones taken under the old regulations. The main
countries targeted are industrial and advanced developing economies—not the
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same pattern observed for the other developing economy antidumping users.
Third, the pattern for cases initiated since 2001 is closer to that observed for the
other intensive antidumping users. This is most clearly illustrated by the steel
cases (echoing the EU and U.S. safeguards) and the ethanolamine cases
(observed in several other antidumping users).
The increasingly similar product pattern suggests that China’s antidumping
enforcement is beginning to join the ongoing process of segmenting world
markets through antidumping activity. It also raises issues of the progressive
capture of China’s trade policy by firms, similar to what is observed in the 10
major antidumping users. In this context it would be important to know
whether petitioners are Chinese firms (private or state-owned) or firms with
strong links with foreign firms (joint ventures, technical relations, vertical
integration) that are experienced in the ‘‘art’’ of antidumping.
IV. CHINA ’S OPT IONS IN THE WTO NEGOTIAT IONS ON
CONTINGENT PROTECT ION
In its antidumping enforcement, China needs to take into account an issue that
the six top developing economy antidumping users have not had to deal with:
China’s WTO accession protocol incorporates specific provisions on antidumping
and safeguards (for a legal analysis, see Vermulst 2000). Seemingly a handicap,
these special provisions can be turned into an instrument of positive change. The
special provision on antidumping could induce China to negotiate in the Doha
Round a more economically sound interpretation of the specific provisions on
antidumping. That could create strong incentives in China for restraining its
own use of antidumping and for fighting for stricter WTO rules on antidumping.
It could give China’s trading partners strong incentives to ease their transition
period of accession. The special provision on safeguards is more difficult to deal
with. This provision is so much at odds with the spirit and rules of the WTO that
its use will raise a large systemic risk for the entire WTO.
Linking China’s Effective Liberalization to Better Treatment of Its
Exports by Antidumping Users
China’s protocol of accession allows its trading partners to use ‘‘nonmarket
economy’’ status in their investigations against allegedly dumped Chinese
exports for 15 years (until 2017). That status allows antidumping investigators
to use proxies for estimating the home market prices or costs of Chinese exports
in determining whether dumping took place. Such proxies make the existence of
dumping much easier to prove than the rules for market economies, and they
inflate the magnitude of the estimated antidumping margins compared to those
(already high) imposed on market economies.
A summary of the information available for 208 EU and U.S. antidumping
cases initiated between 1995 and 1998 gives a sense of the intrinsic biases of the
nonmarket economy procedure (table 7; Lindsey 1999; Messerlin 2000b). The
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further from pure price comparisons the methodology used for estimating
dumping margins, the higher are the estimated margins: from 3 percent (United
States) and 22 percent (European Union) under pure price comparisons to 25
percent under various constructed-value methods. Use of nonmarket economy
status is clearly linked to the highest dumping margins found (40 percent in the
United States and 46 percent in the European Union).3
It is almost impossible to eliminate a provision included in a country’s
protocol of accession. But during the Doha Round it may be possible to
negotiate an economically sound interpretation of the use of the nonmarket
economy status by WTO members. China and its trading partners have a com-
mon interest in establishing the strongest possible link between China’s effective
liberalization and elimination of the use of nonmarket economy status by
foreign antidumping authorities. What is at issue is not the elimination of the
nonmarket economy provision itself (impossible to obtain) but its effective use
in the future.4
The argument aims at mobilizing export interests in both China and the rest
of the world during China’s period of accession to the WTO. Chinese exporters,
3. For instance, under nonmarket economy status, it is possible to use industrial countries (such as the
United States or Sweden) as reference countries for China. That introduces systemic errors about the
product and the production process. For instance, it makes no sense to consider, without deep economic
analysis, the calcium metal produced in small quantities by a U.S. monopolist for its own use as similar to
the calcium metal produced by China and Russia in large quantities for sales on international markets.
The U.S. product is likely to have characteristics in terms of quality and availability that make it very
different from the Russian or Chinese calcium metal, and it is sold and bought in a market structure that
is very different from the markets of its Russian and Chinese counterparts. In the same vein, trying to
estimate production costs by combining input prices in industrial countries and input quantities used in a
developing economy makes little economic sense.
4. EU and U.S. antidumping authorities have already adopted more liberal interpretations in some
cases than the protocol allows. In the European Union, for example, the authorities have accepted
individual treatment or market economy status with respect to some Chinese exports.
TABLE 7. Do Antidumping Investigations Really Look at Dumping?
U.S. cases (1995–98) EU cases (1995–97)
Basis of estimated
normal values
of exports
Number
cases
examined
Average
dumping
margins (%)
Number
cases
examined
Average
dumping
margins (%)
Price comparisons only 5 3.2 8 22.7
Price comparisons and
constructed values
33 14.2 33 24.4
Constructed values 20 25.1 12 25.1
Nonmarket economies 47 40.0 12 45.6
Best available facts 36 95.6 2 74.5
All cases examined 141 44.7 67 29.6
Source: Lindsey (1999) for U.S. cases; Messerlin (2000a) for EU cases.
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knowing that they will face less unfair treatment (no use of the nonmarket
economy status) in foreign antidumping cases if China is effectively opening its
markets in accordance with its accession protocol, will be motivated to
monitor China’s liberalization more closely and support it more strongly,
including through stricter use of antidumping regulations. Foreign exporters,
for their part, will support stricter use of antidumping regulations by their own
authorities, especially with respect to use of nonmarket economy status, if
they believe that they will get more effective and stable access to Chinese
markets.
This could be achieved by implementing the following simple rule. Foreign
antidumping investigators will automatically grant market economy status to
Chinese exporters of any product that meets the three following conditions.
. The Chinese most-favored-nation tariff on the product involved is moder-
ate (say, 10 percent or lower). This threshold tariff will be one of the core
components of a more economically sound interpretation of China’s non-
market economy status to be agreed on during the Doha Round. It could be
stable over time, or it could increase as time passes—showing an increasing
confidence in the ongoing liberalization process among China’s trading
partners.
. No ‘‘core gray-area measures’’ are imposed on the product by the Chinese
authorities. The list of core gray-area measures to be introduced in the
interpretation agreement should also be negotiated during the Doha
Round. The list should be short (say, specific tariffs, quantitative restric-
tions, and minimum prices), and only the listed measures should be con-
sidered part of the conditions.
. State-owned monopolies shall not engage in distributing the competing
foreign and domestic varieties of the product in question. Chinese state-
owned monopoly producers are acceptable because as economic analysis
shows, a protection granted exclusively by a moderate tariff eliminates the
risk of monopoly power of the domestic sole producer.
In 2001, 38 percent of China’s tariff lines had ad valorem tariffs lower than
10 percent (see table 4). (The fact that the Chinese tariff schedule has only
roughly 7,000 tariff lines suggests that it does not offer many opportunities to
create narrow niches of protection for carefully defined tariff items.) Applying
the three conditions would thus substantially reinforce the rights of Chinese
exporters in the antidumping cases lodged in the two Harmonized Tariff System
sections with the largest number of antidumping cases. (But China should take
the initiative to improve the situation in the other antidumping-intensive Har-
monized Tariff System sections, in particular in textiles and clothing.)
These three conditions make it unlikely that Chinese exporters would dump
except for economically sound reasons (differences in demand pattern, need to
meet foreign demand, or to make Chinese products known in foreign markets).
Thus, China’s WTO trading partners should grant China at least the unconditional
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benefit of market economy status in any antidumping investigations faced by
Chinese exports meeting these conditions.5
Negotiations on improved implementation of nonmarket economy status for
China should be as swift as possible. These conditions can easily be defined on a
tariff line (Harmonized Tariff System) basis. For instance, China could notify
the WTO on a regular basis of the tariff lines for which these conditions are met
(this can easily be included in the general monitoring procedures for China’s
accession). Cross-notifications by China’s trading partners could be added to
the process, under the condition that they not slow the process. Finally, weaker
variants of the suggestions could be considered, if necessary. For instance, the
nonmarket economy status could be eliminated for notified goods only after,
say, one year, instead of immediately. However, it is worth noting that any
weakening of the suggested approach may have huge costs in terms of decreas-
ing incentives for export interests in both China and the rest of the world to
support the transition process of China’s accession to the WTO.
Stricter Rules on Antidumping
The desire of China’s chief trade negotiator, Long Yongtu, to introduce stricter
rules on antidumping is a natural extension of the negotiations on use of the
nonmarket economy status proposed here because of the focus on the anti-
dumping rules faced by allegedly dumped exports from market economies.
China’s efforts to introduce stricter rules on WTO antidumping could follow
either of two very different approaches.
A cautious approach would be to table a series of proposals or to support
those already tabled in Geneva for improving WTO-based antidumping regula-
tions at the margin. For instance, the following suggestions, derived from
proposals tabled in 1999 by the Swedish Kommerzkollegium (1999), could
receive China’s support:
. Dumping should be the principal cause of material injury.
. Double protection (for instance, antidumping measures imposed on top of
quantitative restrictions) should not be allowed.
. Measures should last five years at most (implying stronger limits to review).
. Repeated initiations in a short period of time should not be allowed.
. Cumulation of imports from different countries should be banned or
severely restricted, unless they come from the same firms or subsidiaries
of the same firms.
. Aggregation of products under the one single product procedure should be
severely restricted.
5. It could be argued that market forces in China for these relatively unprotected products could be
distorted by Chinese regulations on inputs for such goods (subsidies, for instance). But there are WTO
instruments for addressing such an argument (which could be applied to most China trading partners).
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. All zeroing practices (using only export transactions that have been found
to be dumped in calculating dumping margins) should be banned (all
export transactions should be included in the investigation).
. Antidumping authorities should produce disclosure documents.
. Use of the de minimis rule should be expanded in an economically soundway.
Alternatively, China could adopt a bolder approach. Antidumping could
take, as often as possible, the form of negotiated ‘‘quantitative thresholds’’
(Messerlin 2000a). WTO members could agree that no antidumping measure
should be imposed in cases where the level of injury losses is less than an agreed
threshold of the complainants’ revenues for the year(s) used as the reference
(predumping) period. An approach based on quantitative thresholds is concep-
tually equivalent to tariffication. It tends to give a sense of the magnitude of the
concessions granted by both sides, bringing antidumping more in line with the
usual WTO negotiating techniques. It is also flexible enough to permit incremen-
tal reforms, to deliver the progressive liberalization that WTO members are
looking for, through progressive increases in the thresholds. This would avoid
the current deadlock of binary choices between fully enforcing antidumping
regulations and rejecting them totally.
The Transitional Product-Specific Safeguard Provision
China’s protocol of accession includes a transitional product-specific safeguard
mechanism, which makes it much easier for WTO members to impose safeguard
measures against China’s exports until 2014 (for a detailed description from a
legal perspective see Andersen and Lau 2001). In China’s case, all the terms
defining the use of safeguard actions in the traditional GATT–WTO context (under
Article XIX) have been weakened. There is no requirement of unforeseen
circumstances and no most-favored-nation requirement. Only ‘‘material’’ rather
than ‘‘serious’’ injury needs to be demonstrated. There are fewer factors related
to the condition of the domestic industry, and the causal link between increased
imports and injury is weaker.
The most important difference—and potentially the most devastating for the
WTO—is that WTO members are given the right, never before offered, to use a
trade-diversion clause. As soon as one WTO member implements a transitional
product-specific safeguard measure against Chinese exports, all other members
can enforce a similar measure at almost no procedural cost (no investigation, no
prior notification, no input from Chinese parties). The trade-diversion clause
thus means that countries do not have to provide proof substantiating the
allegation that Chinese exports will be diverted from the first closed market to
the rest of the world.
All these features put the transitional product-specific safeguard at odds with
the usual WTO concerns about a fair balance between rights and obligations. The
provision is so unbalanced that its use could easily trigger in China feelings
similar to those provoked by the unequal treaties of the nineteenth century. The
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transitional product-specific safeguard represents a serious systemic risk to the
WTO regime.
Although it could be argued that the transitional product-specific safeguard is
such a politically aggressive instrument that it would never be used, this seems
unlikely. Because of its politically explosive content, this safeguard is unlikely to
be initiated by any but a very large industrial country WTO member (the United
States, the European Union, or Japan). But once the provision has been trig-
gered, other WTO members that could benefit from the trade-diversion clause
will likely do so.
How can China reduce the risk that the transitional product-specific safeguard
provision will be invoked? One possibility would be for them to negotiate the same
kind of preemptive approach as recommended for the nonmarket economy provi-
sion during the Doha Round. WTO members could agree not to use the transitional
product-specific safeguard provision as long as Chinese products meet the three
conditions presented for use of the nonmarket economy option and to use the
normal WTO safeguard provision under Article XIX instead.
Unifying Contingent Protection in the WTO
Putting antidumping and safeguards on a par would makes a lot of sense from
the perspective of the global WTO architecture. Most WTO members use anti-
dumping measures as a substitute for safeguard actions for dealing with indus-
tries in difficulty. The transitional product-specific safeguard provision
strengthens China’s stake in seeking substantial improvement in the whole
WTO contingent protection regime—both antidumping and safeguards. During
the Doha Round, China could try to expand the negotiations on antidumping to
safeguards (so far not explicitly included in the Doha negotiating program) to
make the entire contingent protection regime of the WTO more consistent.
One promising approach would be to tie together the concept of temporary
protection embedded in safeguards and the basic concept of renegotiation under
GATT Article XXVIII (Messerlin 2000a). Thus, for instance, at the end of the
second period of enforcing a safeguard measure under the current safeguards
agreement (based on GATT Article XIX), the country would be required either to
renegotiate the tariff on the product subjected to safeguard measures or elim-
inate the safeguard measure (shifting to antidumping or other trade remedies
should be prohibited, in recognition that all instruments of contingent protec-
tion are substitutable). This mandatory aspect would help reform safeguard and
antidumping procedures back to the transitory protection they were meant to be
instead of the permanent protection they have become.
The possibility remains that an integrated approach to antidumping, safe-
guards, and transitional product-specific safeguard measures would face
entrenched hostility from WTO members, in particular from the top 10 users of
antidumping provisions. China would then be forced to rely on threats of some
kind of retaliation. The least aggressive approach would be for China to
announce its intention to systematically use the dispute settlement mechanism
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as soon as a WTO member notifies the WTO Secretariat of its intention to use the
transitional product-specific safeguard provision. Lawyers tend to overstate the
benefits of such an approach by ignoring the full development of the trade
conflicts—that is, the political bickering that follows dispute settlement cases (it
is almost certain that dispute settlement cases dealing with the transitional pro-
duct-specific safeguard would leave the two parties in a particularly difficult
political situation). A more aggressive approach by China would be based on
Article 56 of the new regulations, as discussed earlier. However, such an approach
should not ignore the basic principle of deterrence: trade deterrence, like nuclear
deterrence, works as long as it remains a threat—it must stop short of action.
V. CONCLUS ION
Two findings of this analysis are particularly important for China. First, the
countries that stand to gain most from better discipline on antidumping are the
handful of developing economies that have been intensive users of antidumping
since the 1995 Uruguay Round. Because the antidumping measures imposed by
these developing economies tend to be more frequent and severe than those
imposed by industrial countries, these actions hurt developing economies much
more than industrial country–imposed antidumping measures harm industrial
countries’ economies. If China wants to continue to enjoy successful liberal-
ization, it must avoid becoming an intensive user of antidumping.
Second, there are few economic or political forces to act as automatic
restraints on the current situation of antidumping enforcement. Major users of
antidumping measures have few incentives to reform their very discriminatory
use of the antidumping instrument, whereas smaller countries have few incen-
tives to use the antidumping instrument in a retaliatory way.
As a result, China is at a crossroads. One way leads to more intensive use of
antidumping for several reasons: as a retaliatory instrument against foreign anti-
dumping, as a tool for China’s progressive integration into the worldwide collusive
dimension of antidumping (used as an instrument for segmenting world markets
for the benefit of large firms), and as a backdoor entry to old-fashioned protection,
even at the risk of unraveling its scheduled trade liberalization.
Another way leads to a guiding role for China in arguing for stricter rules on
the use of antidumping. As a small antidumping user and a key target of foreign
antidumping, China will be one of the main beneficiaries of such a move, which
will also help them negotiate an economically sound interpretation of the special
provisions on antidumping and safeguards included in its WTO accession proto-
col. This new interpretation should be based on China meeting a few key and
economically sound conditions: low tariffs, no core gray-area measures, no
distribution monopolies (see section IV). This interpretation is motivated by
strong economic and political arguments. China and its trading partners have a
common interest in establishing the strongest possible links between China’s
effective trade liberalization and agreement not to use these special provisions
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against Chinese exporters. This interpretation seeks to mobilize export interests
in both China and the rest of the world to their mutual gain during the difficult
implementation period of China’s accession to the WTO.
REFERENCES
Andersen, Scott, and Christian Lau. 2001. Hedging Hopes with Fears in China’ Accession to the World
Trade Organization: The Transitional Special Product Safeguard for Chinese Exports. Geneva:
Powell, Goldstein, Frazer and Murphy.
Bloningen, Bruce. 2001. ‘‘Database on U.S. Antidumping Cases.’’ Online document available at
www.uoregon.edu.
Lindsey, Brink. 1999. The U.S. Antidumping Law: Rhetoric versus Reality. Washington, D.C.: Cato
Institute.
Lindsey, Brink, and Dan Ikenson. 2001. Coming Home to Roost: Proliferating Antidumping Laws and
the Growing Threat to U.S. Exports. Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute.
Kommerzkollegium. 1999. Further Actions within the EU in the Field of Antidumping. Stockholm.
Messerlin, Patrick A. 2000a. ‘‘Antidumping and Safeguards.’’ In Jeff Schott, ed., The WTO After Seattle.
Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics.
———. 2000b. ‘‘An Economic Perspective on Antidumping and Safeguards.’’ Seminar on Antidumping
and Safeguards. Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, Department of International
Trade and Economic Affairs, Beijing.
Vermulst, Edwin. 2000. ‘‘Contingent Protection Provisions in China’s Draft Protocol on Accession to the
WTO.’’ Seminar on Antidumping and Safeguards, Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Coopera-
tion, Department of International Trade and Economic Affairs, Beijing.
Wang, Lei. 2003. ‘‘China’s New Antidumping Regulations: Improvement to Comply with the WTO
Rules.’’ East Associates, Beijing. [lwang@ealawfirm.com.]
WTO (World Trade Organization). 2001. ‘‘Market Access: Unfinished Business, Post-Uruguay Round
Inventory and Issues.’’ Special Studies 6. Geneva.
130 THE WORLD BANK ECONOMIC REV I EW, VOL . 18 , NO . 1
